Anyone with long-lived sensitive data
If what you're sending now would still be sensitive in 2035 (health records, legal documents, source code, personal communications), PQC is the only thing keeping it private long-term.
ML-KEM-768 + X25519 hybrid key exchange on every connection. NIST FIPS 203 standard. Your sessions stay private against tomorrow's quantum computer.
State-level adversaries already record encrypted traffic at scale, betting that practical quantum computers will let them decrypt it within the next 10-15 years. The cryptography that protects most internet traffic today — RSA, ECDH, ECDSA — is provably breakable by a sufficiently powerful quantum computer using Shor's algorithm. Anything you send through a VPN today that depends on those primitives could be readable in 2035. Post-quantum cryptography fixes this now, not when the quantum computer arrives, because by then your archived traffic is already in the queue.
On every connection, SecureFox negotiates a hybrid key exchange combining X25519 (classical, fast, well-understood) with ML-KEM-768 (post-quantum, NIST FIPS 203). The session key is derived from both — to break it, an attacker needs to break BOTH. ML-KEM-768 is quantum-resistant by design; X25519 is the fallback in case some unknown weakness is later found in ML-KEM. There is no non-PQC fallback path — even if you're on a server that doesn't support hybrid (we audited; they all do), the connection fails closed rather than downgrading.
If what you're sending now would still be sensitive in 2035 (health records, legal documents, source code, personal communications), PQC is the only thing keeping it private long-term.
State-level recorded traffic is the most-targeted dataset for future quantum decryption.
Nobody knows exactly when practical quantum computing arrives. PQC is the only certainty that 'it doesn't matter for your traffic'.
Most credible estimates put the threshold at 2030-2040 for breaking RSA-2048 or P-256. Cryptographically relevant quantum computers don't exist yet. The point of PQC today is that adversaries are already archiving traffic in anticipation.
It's the NIST-selected lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism, standardised as FIPS 203 in August 2024. It offers a strong security-performance balance and has the broadest ecosystem support of any PQ algorithm.
Negligibly. ML-KEM-768 adds about 1KB to the handshake and a few hundred microseconds of CPU. Once the session key is established, the data path is the same AES-256-GCM as any other connection.
PQ algorithms are newer and less battle-tested than X25519. Hybrid mode means an attacker needs to break BOTH — so even if some weakness is later found in ML-KEM, you're still protected by X25519.
A few do, usually as an opt-in. We chose to make it mandatory because the cost is negligible and the harvest-now-decrypt-later attack is already happening.
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